We consider uplink power control in wireless communication when massive users compete over the channel resources. In Part I [1], we have formulated massive transmission power control contest in a mean-field game framework. In this part, our goal is to investigate whether the power-domain non-orthogonal multiple access (NOMA) protocol can regulate the non-cooperative channel access behaviors, i.e., steering the competition among the noncooperative users in a direction with improved efficiency and fairness. It is compared with the CDMA protocol, which drives each user to fiercely compete against the population, hence the efficiency of channel usage is sacrificed. The existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium strategy under CDMA and NOMA have already been characterized in Part I. In this paper, we adopt the social welfare of the population as the performance metric, which is defined as the expectation of utility over the distribution of different types of channel users. It is shown that under the corresponding equilibrium strategies, NOMA outperforms CDMA in the social welfare achieved, which is illustrated through simulation with different unit price for power consumption. Moreover, it can be observed from numerical results that NOMA can improve the fairness of the achieved data rates among different users.
under CDMA and NOMA. A direct question emerges that whether NOMA, which regulates the power contest among massive players through interference cancellation, is capable of outperforming CDMA in terms of the social welfare achieved.
Different from the cases with a centralized decision maker, the performance comparison in a game-theoretic model is intractable due to the decentralized information pattern as well as the non-cooperative nature of the players. In order to conveniently conduct comparisons between the performance achieved under different games, it is necessary to build a bridge between games and optimization problems. Analyses in this direction are closely related to the price of anarchy (PoA), which discusses the degradation of the efficiency of the system when the players are non-cooperative compared to the centralized case.
The connection between the equilibria of a game and the optimal solution to an optimization problem, especially the PoA, has been addressed frequently in the literature. A seminal study has been carried out by Dubey [5] , where the theoretical foundation is laid for the inefficiency of the equilibria in a game with finite players. Since then, works have been focusing on the efficiency of selfish routing. Roughgarden and Tardos [6] considered a routing game over a congested network, and quantified the efficiency degradation for linear latency functions. Then, Mavronicolas and Spirakis [7] investigated PoA of routing game with a simple topology of parallel links, both uniform and non-uniform link capacities are considered. Roughgarden [8] have shown that the PoA of a routing game in presence of network congestion is independent of the network topology. Moreover, Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou [9] characterized the upper and lower bound of PoA when agents share a common resource. An application of PoA is discussed by Deori et al. [10] , where the authors considered the electric vehicle charging game.
With the development of mean-field decision models, analysis on the connections between the mean-field equilibria and the social optimality has been carried out for various problems. Huang et al. [11] considered an LQG control problem in the mean-field setup, where the team optimal solution based on the decentralized information structure is shown to achieve social optimal asymptotically. Later, both Nourian et al. [12] considered mean-field games for synchronization of a large number of oscillators, and characterized the efficiency loss at the game equilibrium. In order to perform computation and analysis on mean-field equilibrium more conveniently, Li et al. [13] proposed an equivalent formulation of a class of mean-field games as optimization problems, in which the LQG mean-field game is an example. For modeling the evolution of the game equilibria when the number of players in a game approaches infinity, Lacker and Ramanan [14] adopted a probabilistic model to characterize the speed for some rare equilibria to vanish. To further generalize the results about the PoA of a mean-field stochastic dynamic game, Cardaliaguet and Rainer [15] characterized the upper bound and the lower bound of the efficiency loss corresponding to the mean-field equilibria for a general cost function. Similarly, Carmona et al. [16] considered the PoA for the linear quadratic extended type of mean-field games.
In this paper, we plan to carry out the social welfare comparison under the equilibrium strategies for uplink transmission under CDMA and NOMA protocols respectively. Similar to aforementioned works in PoA, this paper also exploits the connection between non-cooperative games and social welfare optimization problems for performance comparison. The main challenges are listed as follows.
(1) A unified framework needs to be developed such that the shift of equilibria as we switch from CDMA to NOMA protocol can be characterized, and the corresponding social welfare achieved can be compared; (2) Previous results [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] on performance comparison between NOMA and orthogonal multiple access (OMA) mainly deal with a centralized decision model. It is challenging to extend this comparison to a non-cooperative setup due to the coupling among the actions chosen by different users. As an answer to address these challenges, we have the following contributions in this work: (1) In order to present the mean-field games under a unified framework, we propose functional optimization problems (Problem 3 and Problem 4) for comparison purposes rather than calculation, where CDMA and NOMA communication protocols are posed as different constraints. Such an optimization perspective has also been adopted by Chen et al. [20] , while our contribution lies in the extension to non-cooperative setup and generalization to the analysis in functional spaces; (2) We have shown the coincidence between the mean-field equilibria and the optimal solution to the optimization problems (Theorem 3); (3) As a bridge, the optimization perspective simplifies the social welfare comparison between game equilibria. And differ from previous works, we have theoretically characterized the social welfare enhancement of NOMA in comparison to CDMA (as a representative of OMA) in a non-cooperative formulation (Theorem 4). The remainder of Part II is organized as follows. In Section II, some notations and key results in Part I [1] have been reviewed. In Section III, we transform the mean-field uplink communication games under CDMA and NOMA protocols as their equivalent models in the form of optimization problems. The main results on the equilibrium social welfare comparison is presented in this section as well. Then, in Section IV, we give some detailed results on the individual behaviors at the equilibrium. To illustrate the social welfare comparison results, we present the numerical simulations in Section V. Finally, we draw the conclusions in Section VI.
Notations:
We denote the set of non-negative numbers as R + and the set of positive numbers as R ++ . The set of non-negative integers is denoted as N + . The standard unit vector in the direction of the i-th dimension is denoted as e i = (0, 0, . . . , 1 i−th , . . . , 0) ∈ R N . For any Lebesgue measurable set A ⊂ R, denote its Lebesgue measure as λ(A). And the abbreviation "a.e." is adopted for "almost everywhere". The space of all F-valued measurable function on (X, B(X)) is denoted as M F (X), where B(X) is the Borel σ-algebra of X. And for any l ≤ u, we define a truncation operator as [x] u l := min{u, max{l, x}} for any x ∈ R. The modulus of a complex number z = x + iy ∈ C is z := x 2 + y 2 , where x, y ∈ R.
II. REVISITING THE MEAN-FIELD GAME MODEL AND THE

EQUILIBRIUM STRATEGY
In Part I [1] , we have proposed a mean-field game model G = (M, A, u) for the competition among a large number of uplink channel users, in which the users transmit over the shared Gaussian channel through proper power allocation, and each channel user interacts with the population in a non-cooperative manner. As formulated in Part I [1] , spread spectrum technique is applied under both CDMA and NOMA. Each of the N uplink users sharing the communication channel is assigned a unique signature sequence with length n s so that the transmitted signal can be spreaded over different subcarriers (i.e., code chips). As described by [22] , the squared correlation between the signature sequences s k and s j of users k and j (k = j) can be expressed as β k,j = (s k s j ) 2 ≈ 1 ns = α N . Hence, the parameter α := N ns . And in order for each user to be assigned a distinct signature sequence for spectrum spreading, there is 0 < α ≤ 1.
Now we recall the details on the components of the meanfield game G as follows.
(1) The set of players is denoted as M ⊂ R. If we pick an arbitrary user i in the population and denote its uplink channel gain as h i ∈ C, its user identity will be expressed as θ i := h i 2 ∈ M . According to Assumption 2 in Part I [1] , we assume M = ∅ and 0 / ∈ M to avoid triviality and singularity. The probability density function of the user identity is expressed as f (x) > 0, x ∈ M , and it has a finite first order moment (i.e., R xf (x)dx < ∞) according to Assumption 1 in Part I [1] . For M ⊂ R ++ , a measure space is defined as (M, B(M ), λ) based on the Lebesgue measure λ. Now we define a weighted measure ν as follows.
The weight function w : M → [0, ∞) in the definition of the measure ν is introduced as
Consequently, a new measure space (M, B(M ), ν) is generated.; (2) The feasible set of transmission power levels is defined
And the power allocation strategy is a function p : M → E. Then, we define the set of feasible strategies as A :
For a type of players θ i ∈ M , their utility function is denoted as u(a i , p, θ i ). Specifically, the expression of the utility is given by u(a i , p, θ i ) = log 2 (1 + θ i · SINR(p, θ i )) − βa i , where a i is the power level chosen by users with identity θ i , the constant β > 0 denotes the unit price for power consumption and the opponents' strategy is p ∈ A. The term SINR(p, θ i ) is the signal-tointerference-plus-noise ratio of user θ i 's signal received by the base station. According to Part I [1] , it is expressed as SINR(p, θ i ) := ai αE[p(θj )θj ]+N0 , ∀θ i ∈ M when CDMA is adopted, and it is expressed as SINR(p,
And the definition for a projection operator is recalled as follows.
Definition 1: For any given closed convex set X ⊂ R, define an orthogonal projection operator P X : R → X such that P X (x) := arg min z∈X |z − x|, ∀x ∈ R.
To characterize the equilibrium behaviors of the massive players under CDMA and NOMA protocols, we have established the existence and the uniqueness of the equilibrium strategy profile in Part I, together with some properties regarding continuity and monotonicity of the transmission power allocation strategy with respect to the identities of users θ i ∈ M .
Before presenting the main results for equilibrium social welfare comparison in Part II, it is necessary to restate the main theorems in Part I. First of all, we revisit the definition of the mean-field equilibrium and the best response operator.
Definition 2 (Mean-field equilibrium): A strategy profile p * ∈ A is a mean-field equilibrium of a game with an infinite number of players if for any θ i ∈ M , we have
For the static mean-field game G, we define the best response of user θ i ∈ M in presence of the opponents' strategy p ∈ A as a set-valued mapping BR :
Hence, a strategy p * ∈ A is a mean-field equilibrium if and only if for any θ i ∈ M , there is p * (θ i ) ∈ BR(θ i , p * ). Now, some definitions in Part I [1] are revisited, where two operators are defined based on the measure ν defined in (1) .
Definition 3: For any Lebesgue measurable function g : M → R, we introduce Given these operators, we introduce some vector spaces. The space of all strategy profiles inducing a finite interference term under CDMA protocol is defined as
According to [23] , the vector space
On the other hand, the vector space consisting of all strategies with bounded power allocation is defined as
is a Banach space. And for ease of presentation, we adopt the convention that two functions are equivalent if they are equal ν-a.e.
Then, results concerning the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium strategy of massive users under CDMA protocol are restated below.
According to Part I [1] , the utility function of the user θ i in the case of CDMA can be expressed as
Theorem 1 (The equilibrium in CDMA [1] ): Assume α = 1, there exists a unique mean-field equilibrium p * ∈ A ⊂ L 1 (M, R, ν) when CDMA with single user detection is adopted in the game G, and the utility function of each player is given by (8) .
Moreover, we also obtain the result on the continuity and monotonicity of the equilibrium strategy profile under the CDMA protocol based on the results in parametric optimization. Denote the unique mean-field equilibrium of the game G as p * ∈ A when CDMA is adopted.
Corollary 1: The mean-field equilibrium strategy p * : M → E is continuous and monotonically increasing with respect to the identifier θ i ∈ M .
Proof: See Appendix I. Likewise, when NOMA is adopted as the communication protocol, the utility function of any user θ i ∈ M is given by
Theorem 2 (The equilibrium in NOMA [1] ): Assume α = 1, there exists a unique mean-field equilibrium p * ordered ∈ A ⊂ L ∞ (M, R, ν) when NOMA is adopted in the game G with fixed SIC decoding order following the descending order of the channel gain h i 2 , and the utility function of each player is given by (9) . Corollary 2: For the game G adopting NOMA, the unique equilibrium strategy p * ordered : M → E characterized in Theorem 2 is continuous with respect to θ i ∈ M .
Proof: See Appendix II.
III. SOCIAL WELFARE COMPARISON BETWEEN CDMA AND NOMA Now that the game G under both CDMA and NOMA communication protocol admit a unique mean-field equilibrium, it is of interest to conduct social welfare comparison when massive players reach equilibrium under these two protocols respectively. In this paper, we focus more on qualitative analysis than quantitative analysis.
In general, the social welfare comparison between meanfield equilibria of different games is not easily achievable since it will be difficult to trace the drift of the equilibrium points. However, in an optimization problem, the change of optimal value of the objective function under different constraints can be evaluated based on the Lagrangian dual method [24] . As motivated by Li et al. [13] , where the connection between a class of mean-field games and optimization problems is established, it is desirable to conduct the social welfare comparison from the perspective of optimization. In a mean-field game with a large number of players, we define the social welfare as the average utility achieved by all players.
In this paper, we aim at comparing the effectiveness of the NOMA communication protocol in 5G network against the CDMA protocol. As introduced in the previous sections, the intrinsic difference between NOMA and CDMA is that whether successive interference cancellation (SIC) is adopted. The social welfare comparison of the game equilibria achieved under two different communication protocols can be formulated as two optimization problems with a common objective function (i.e., the social welfare metric), several different constraints (i.e., different communication protocols) as well as a common constraint reflecting the definition of a mean-field equilibrium, which restricts the solution set of each optimization problem to be within the set of mean-field equilibria. The mathematical details are illustrated below.
First, we define the social welfare metric in terms of
where p ∈ A and z : M → R is ν-measurable, with the individual utilityũ corresponding to each player θ i defined as a function of the action p(θ i ) taken by player θ i and the interference effects z. The expressions of individual utilitiesũ, based on the formulation of the mean-field game, can be expressed as
Remark 1: Whenever the number of users N approaches infinity, the social welfare can be approximated by the expectation of individual utilities with respect to the distribution of the user identity θ i ∈ M . Hence, the social welfare metric J(p, z) introduced above can be interpreted as a representation of the average utility of a large number of users attempting to access the uplink channel. Now we consider the following two optimization problems corresponding to CDMA and NOMA separately. These optimization problems are formulated for comparison rather than computation.
Problem 1 (CDMA):
It can be observed that when the constraints in Problem 1 and Problem 2 are satisfied, the optimal solutions to each problem is restricted to the set of mean-field equilibria, due to the equivalence between the constraints and Definition 2.
If we relax the constraints on the interference term z(θ i ) into inequalities, the following problems can be obtained.
Problem 3 (CDMA -relaxed):
Problem 4 (NOMA -relaxed):
Remark 2: We plan to model the non-cooperative interactions among massive channel user under different communication protocols as the solutions to underlying optimization problems with different constraints. If we relax the constraints on the interference term z(θ i ) as inequalities (i.e., the first constraint in (14) and (15) respectively), an inclusion relationship between the feasible sets of the two problems is introduced, hence the social welfare comparison can be conducted in a straightforward manner. It should be noted that the solutions to the corresponding optimization problems are not affected by the relaxation in constraints as the objective function will "drive" the interference z(θ i ) to take equality in the constraint, which is shown in Lemma 1.
For the two optimization problems considered above, the only difference lies in the constraints on the interference effects z. Before we compare the equilibrium social welfare of CDMA and NOMA, we first show some necessary conditions for optimality of the solutions to Problems 3 and 4.
Lemma 1 (Necessary conditions for optimality): For any pair of optimal solution (p * 1 , z * 1 ) to Problem 3, it is necessary for it to satisfy z *
Similarly, for Problem 4, a necessary condition for a pair (p * 2 , z * 2 ) to be an optimal solution is that
Proof: See Appendix III. With the necessary conditions for optimality shown above, we verify the coincidence between optimal solutions to Problem 3, Problem 4 and the equilibria of the corresponding mean-field games.
Theorem 3 (Coincidence between optima and equilibria): Assume α = 1, the mean-field equilibria of the game G under CDMA achieve the optimal value of the objective function in Problem 3. And the mean-field equilibria of the game G under NOMA achieve the optimal value of the objective function in Problem 4.
Proof: In Lemma 1, some necessary conditions for the optimal solutions to Problem 3 and Problem 4 are presented, which are required to hold almost everywhere. In this theorem, we are going to show that any variable pair (p, z) satisfying Lemma 1 achieves the same value of the objective function as the mean-field equilibria, i.e., the violation of the conditions in Lemma 1 on a zero-measure set does not impact the performance achieved. Hence, it can be verified that the meanfield equilibria are the optimal solutions to the corresponding optimization problem. For brevity, the detailed proof is only presented for the case of NOMA (i.e., Problem 4), and Problem 3 can follow similar arguments.
It can be obtained from Definition 2 that the pair of decision variable (p * , z * ), which corresponds to the unique mean-field equilibrium p * ordered proposed by Theorem 2, should satisfy the following conditions. Fix this pair of feasible variable, we construct its corresponding auxiliary variable pair (p,z) as follows.
andp
As a result, we can obtain that
In order to verify that the pair of auxiliary variables (p,z) satisfy the necessary condition for optimality derived in Lemma 
We derive that
where the second equality holds due to the fact that the set M 0 has Lebesgue measure zero, i.e., P (M 0 ) = 0. As a result, the pair of auxiliary variables (p,z) satisfy
Since these conditions correspond to the definition of meanfield equilibrium of the game G when NOMA is adopted, and the mean-field equilibrium strategy for NOMA exists and is unique according to Theorem 2. Hence, we can obtain that (p,z) = (p * , z * ). Now, since P (M 0 ) = 0, we analyze the value of the objective function achieved, as follows.
Therefore, the arbitrarily chosen feasible strategy (p, z) satisfying the necessary condition of optimality achieves exactly the same value of the objective function J(p, z) as the meanfield equilibrium p * ordered . Then, it can be concluded that the mean-field equilibrium p * ordered achieves the optimal value of the objective function J(p, z) in the optimization problem. The proof is finished.
Remark 3: Based on Theorem 3, the social welfare comparison between different equilibrium points becomes tractable from the optimization perspective. Following the trend of performance evaluation involving NOMA, we aim at extending the existing literature [18] [19] [20] [21] illustrating the superiority of NOMA over OMA to a non-cooperative setup. Though fixed decoding order and perfect interference cancellation have been assumed in Part I [1] , as long as the existence of mean-field equilibrium holds, Theorem 3 together with the social welfare comparison in Theorem 4 as follows is expected to hold for more general formulations without these assumptions.
The main result on the social welfare comparison between CDMA and NOMA is given in the following theorem.
Theorem 4 (NOMA outperforms CDMA under equilibria): When 0 < α < 1, in terms of the social welfare, i.e., the expected utility u achieved by the population of uplink users, the social welfare achieved at the mean-field equilibrium of the game G adopting NOMA is at least as good as the equilibrium social welfare of the game adopting CDMA.
Proof: Based on Theorem 3, since both Problem 3 and Problem 4 are feasible, and the optimal values of their objective functions can be attained within the feasible sets, their optimal values can be alternatively expressed in the following form.
We denote the feasible set of Problem 3 and Problem 4 as C 1 and C 2 respectively, and their corresponding optimal values as J
, we obtain that C 1 ⊂ C 2 . As the optimal value of these two problems can be expressed by J * 1 := sup J(p, z). We conclude that J * 1 ≤ J * 2 . This indicates that in terms of the expected utility achieved under equilibrium strategy, NOMA will perform at least as good as CDMA.
IV. INDIVIDUAL BEHAVIORS AT THE EQUILIBRIUM
The collective behaviors comparison among the population of users has been conducted in the previous section. It is of interest to characterize some individual behaviors at the equilibrium.
We present below the cutoff property of the equilibrium strategy for both CDMA and NOMA. According to Theorem 1 and Theorem 2, denote the unique equilibrium strategy for CDMA as p * ∈ A and the equilibrium strategy for NOMA as p * ordered ∈ A. Proposition 1 (Transmission cutoff): Assume E min = 0, i.e., it is feasible for a user to turn off its antenna and choose not to transmit. Then, there exist cutoff thresholds 0 < θ NOMA th < θ CDMA th such that under equilibrium strategies of CDMA and NOMA, users with identity below the thresholds will choose not to transmit, i.e., p * (θ i ) = 0 for any θ i ≤ θ CDMA th and p * ordered (θ i ) = 0 for any θ i ≤ θ NOMA th . Proof: We start from the case of CDMA, the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium strategy p * ∈ A is given in Theorem 1. For an arbitrary user identity θ i ∈ M , its transmission power control action under the equilibrium strategy p * is obtained from the best response operator (4), which can be explicitly expressed as
Through solving the function p * (θ i ) = 0, it can be obtained that p
though a closed-form of p * (θ j ) is not available, the cutoff threshold for the user identity under CDMA protocol can be expressed as θ CDMA th := β ln 2{αE[p * (θ j )θ j ] + N 0 } > 0. On the other hand, we consider the case when NOMA with fixed decoding order is adopted. It is known from the problem formulation that the decoding order follows the descending order of user identity θ i = h i 2 .
The definition of the cutoff threshold θ NOMA th under NOMA requires p * ordered (θ i ) = 0 for any users θ i ≤ θ NOMA th . Hence, the interference faced by the users with identity θ NOMA th should be E[p * ordered (θ i )θ j 1 {θj <θi} ] = 0. As a result, it can be obtained from the definition of the best response operator (4) that θ NOMA
Then, the cutoff threshold for NOMA is θ NOMA th = N 0 β ln 2 > 0, and we have θ NOMA
The cutoff property in the equilibrium power allocation strategy indicates that uplink users with sufficiently small channel gain will choose not to transmit. Next, for an unbounded set M of user identities, we obtain an additional property such that for users with sufficiently large uplink channel gains, their equilibrium transmission power under CDMA and NOMA can be arbitrarily close.
Proposition 2 (Convergence behavior for high-gain users): Assume the player set M is unbounded above, i.e., ∀L > 0, ∃θ i ∈ M s.t. θ i > L. Then
Proof: By definition of the equilibrium strategies p * and p * ordered , we obtain the following inequality based on the best response operator (4). For any θ i ∈ M ,
For any > 0, we choose θ > 2αEmaxE[ h 2 ] . Then we obtain that |p * (θ i ) − p * ordered (θ i )| < for any θ > θ , which completes the proof.
More importantly, it can be obtained that the curve of equilibrium power allocation for different users under CDMA and NOMA will have a crossing, hence the curve of equilibrium data rate achieved under CDMA and NOMA also crosses. In other words, pointwise improvement in the equilibrium data rate for different types of users is not achievable through adopting NOMA instead of CDMA. Intuitively, there is "no free lunch" in employing NOMA to improve the overall system performance.
Proposition 3 (Infeasibility of pointwise improvement):
Assume E min = 0, it can be obtained that the curve of equilibrium power strategy p * of CDMA will cross p * ordered of NOMA. Consequently, it is infeasible to achieve pointwise improvement in the equilibrium data rate achieved by NOMA in comparison with CDMA.
Proof: First, we show that the curve of p * crosses p * ordered , which we will prove by contradiction.
Assume that the curve of p * and p * ordered never crosses. According to Proposition 1, the cutoff thresholds satisfies 0 < θ NOMA th < θ CDMA th , hence the nonexistence of crossing can be expressed as p * (θ i ) ≤ p * ordered (θ i ) for any θ i ∈ M . According to (21) and a similar condition for NOMA
, which holds for any θ i ∈ M . By taking a sufficiently large θ i ∈ M , we can
as the inequality holds for both directions.
Given
The expression above can be equivalently interpreted as
i.e., p * = p * ordered , ν-a.e, where ν is defined in (1) . Again, we recall the cutoff property in Proposition 1, which indicates that the cutoff thresholds 0 < θ NOMA th < θ CDMA th are strictly different for p * and p * ordered . As both the function p * : M → E and p * ordered : M → E are shown to be continuous with respect to θ i ∈ M in Corollary 1 and Corollary 2, it is impossible to have p * = p * ordered , ν-a.e. Therefore, contradiction emerges, which verifies that the power allocation strategies p * crosses p * ordered . Secondly, we show that pointwise improvement in the curve of equilibrium data rate achieved for different users is impossible.
Denote the type variable at which p * crosses p * ordered as θ cross ∈ M . The crossing behaviors cannot happen at saturation region, i.e., E min or E max . According to (21) and (23) as well as the continuity of p * (θ i ) and p * ordered (θ i ) with respect to θ i ∈ M , there exists a sufficiently small δ > 0 such that for any |θ − θ cross | < δ, we have
We denote the equilibrium data achieved by CDMA and NOMA at user type θ i ∈ M as d * CDMA (θ i ) = log 2 
separately. Then, based on the conditions on θ cross above, it can be obtained that for any |θ − θ cross | < δ,
and d * NOMA (θ) = log 2
The function d * CDMA (θ) and d * NOMA (θ) have the same monotonicity properties with respect to θ ∈ M as p * (θ) and p * ordered (θ) respectively when |θ − θ cross | < δ. Therefore, the curve of equilibrium data achieved for different users under CDMA crosses that under NOMA, i.e., pointwise improvement in the equilibrium data rate is infeasible through adopting NOMA instead of CDMA.
V. SIMULATIONS
In this section, we numerically illustrate the results concerning the properties of the equilibrium strategy profile under both CDMA (with fierce competition) and NOMA (as a natural fair principle). The simulation results as follows will be presented with the purpose to demonstrate the capability for NOMA to enhance the social welfare and fairness among heterogeneous users.
First, we introduce some parameters and setups adopted in the simulation. We consider that the channel gain h i for each user follows Rayleigh fading. Specifically, for an arbitrary user, the probability density function for the squared magnitude of its channel gain θ i = h i 2 is expressed as
Otherwise.
During simulation, we adopt the parameter σ = 5, the probability density function is shown in the figure below. It is intractable to evaluate the behaviors of an infinite number of players for a numerical simulation, nor is it of interest in practice. Hence, the results we present below are generated with N = 1000 players. The white noise process w[k] in the additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) channel features a power spectrum density N 0 = 5, and the spread spectrum parameter α = N ns = 0.1 applies to both the case of CDMA and NOMA. In the MFG, we assume the set of feasible power levels is E = [0, 150]. Now, we calculate the equilibrium power allocation strategy of the game G as well as the corresponding data rates when CDMA and NOMA are adopted respectively, as shown in Fig. 2 .
The equilibrium power allocation strategy is analysed first. It is noticed that the gap between the equilibrium strategy of CDMA and NOMA decreases as the value of the tradeoff parameter β > 0 increase. An intuitive interpretation is that the tradeoff parameter β, which determines the cost of unit power consumption, will have a stronger regulating power when it takes a larger value because it results in a more conservative strategy for each user. Thus, through increasing the value of β, fierce competitions in CDMA (i.e., high transmission power always results in a high data rate) can be relieved to a certain extent. Hence, the equilibrium power allocation under CDMA will gradually approach a natural fairness introduced through NOMA (i.e., signals from users with high channel gains or receiving gains benefit from their superiority of magnitude at the receiver, while others benefit from successive interference cancellation) as β increases. Besides, it is noticeable that the power consumption is significantly reduced with increase in the value of β, for which an intuitive interpretation is the decrease of demand as unit price rises. The design problem of pricing in resource allocation has been investigated in [25] [26] [27] .
The improvement in user fairness achieved by NOMA can be observed from the curves of achieved data rate in Fig. 2 . With the same tradeoff parameter β > 0 in the utility functions, NOMA features a more balanced level of achieved data rates than CDMA, especially for users with a smaller channel gain. Similar to the analysis of equilibrium power allocation strategy, for the achieved data rate of different sensors, increasing the value of β will also eliminate the gap between the curve of data rate achieved under CDMA and NOMA. However, as indicated by Fig. 2 , the increase in β is undesirable for NOMA such that the improvement of user fairness vanishes. Aside from that, the level of data rates achieved in general, though slightly decreased with a larger β, does not vary much.
With these observations, some empirical statements concerning the applicability of CDMA and NOMA can be made: (1) For the cases with a small cost for power consumption (i.e., β > 0 takes a small value), NOMA is suitable for its advantages in the fairness achieved; (2) For the case of costly power resources (i.e., β > 0 takes a large value), the performance gap between CDMA and NOMA is ignorable, thus CDMA excels for its convenience of implementation. In the following, we focus on some properties theoretically shown in the main results. It is of interest to provide some numerical verification to them, which is helpful in obtaining intuitive understandings. In Fig. 2 , the properties established in Corollary 1 and Corollary 2 concerning the continuity and monotonicity of the equilibrium strategies can already be observed.
The comparison between equilibrium social welfare under CDMA and NOMA, as analysed in Theorem 4, constitutes a key portion of the main results in this paper. Thus, we numerically evaluate the expected utility of all participants, i.e., the objective function J(p * , z * ) = E[u(p * (θ i ), p * , θ i )] defined in (10) . This metric of social welfare corresponds to the average level of tradeoff between the data rate and the energy cost among a large number of non-cooperative uplink users.
The expected utilities under game equilibrium are evaluated for different β > 0. Moreover, the curve achieved with CDMA and NOMA are contrasted with each other for visually illustrating the effectiveness of NOMA in social welfare enhancement, as shown in Fig. 3 .
It is observed from Fig. 3 that NOMA can indeed achieve a social welfare which is no worse than CDMA, hence is in accordance with the theoretical results in Theorem 4. In addition, we observe that when the value of β > 0 is small, more effective performance improvement is achieved by NOMA, which coincides with our intuitive analysis above. When β > 0 takes a large value, the regulating effects of the energy cost dominates, thus the benefits of implementing the NOMA protocol gradually shrinks.
VI. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, we have considered an uplink power control problem for wireless communication when massive users are competing for the channel resources. Both power-domain NOMA and CDMA are investigated, on which the noncooperative channel access model is based. When analyzing the equilibrium behaviors of this non-cooperative channel access problem, a mean-field game (MFG) model is adopted to relieve the computation burden. The existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium strategy are established for CDMA and NOMA respectively in Part I [1] . In this part, based on the previous results, performance evaluation has been conducted under the equilibrium strategies. A comparison of the equilibrium social welfare indicates that NOMA achieves a tradeoff between the throughput and power consumption which is at least as good as CDMA. Intuitively, since CDMA features fierce contest, it does not promote efficiency. The powerdomain NOMA, on the other hand, can drive the interplay among users to follow a natural fair principle. Results are verified with numerical simulations. In future works, a more general form of utility functions can be considered.
APPENDIX I PROOF OF COROLLARY 1
Proof: Since the existence and uniqueness of meanfield equilibrium in the game G adopting CDMA protocol have already been shown in Theorem 1, by the definition of a mean-field equilibrium, we can express the equilibrium strategy profile p * as a best response, i.e.,
When the opponents' strategy is fixed to the equilibrium strategy p * ∈ A, it turns out that the utility u(a i , p * , θ i ) is a strictly concave function defined on E × M . Hence, the best response of player θ i is a singleton, i.e., BR(θ i , p) takes a unique value for each θ i ∈ M under a fixed p. According to Theorem 9.17 in [28] , for a strictly concave continuous function u(a i , p, θ i ) under any fixed p, the singlevalued maximizer BR(θ i , p) is a continuous function with respect to the parameter θ i . Due to the existence and uniqueness of the mean-field equilibrium strategy profile p * , the function p * (θ i ) ∈ BR(θ i , p * ), as a best response to itself, is a continuous function.
Next, we proceed to show that the equilibrium strategy profile p * : M → E is monotonically increasing with respect to θ i ∈ M . Beforehand, it is necessary to show that the utility function u(a i , p, θ i ), for any fixed p, satisfies strictly increasing difference in (a i , θ i ). In other words, we need to verify that
From the expression of the utility function u, we obtain
Thus, it is obvious that u(a + i , p, θ) − u(a − i , p, θ) is monotonically increasing with respect to θ for any given a + i > a − i , which leads to (27) . Besides, for any fixed p and θ i , the utility function u is a continuous function defined on a compact interval E = [u min , u max ]. According to the extreme value theorem, the utility u must attain its maximum within E for any given p and θ i . Therefore, according to Theorem 10.6 in [28] , the mean-field equilibrium strategy p * , as the optimal action for maximizing u(a i , p * , θ i ), is monotonically increasing with respect to the identifier θ i ∈ M .
APPENDIX II PROOF OF COROLLARY 2
Proof: By definition, the equilibrium strategy p * ordered is the best response to itself given the utility function u(a i , p, θ i ) for NOMA. In Theorem 2, we have already established the existence and uniqueness of p * ordered : M → E. Then, we have
is a singleton for each given θ i ∈ M . By Theorem 9.17 in [28] , the best response BR ordered (θ i , p * ordered ) is a upper semi-continuous correspondence on M . As BR ordered (θ i , p * ordered ) is a singleton for any θ i ∈ M , it can be concluded that p * ordered (θ i ) ∈ BR ordered (θ i , p * ordered ) is continuous with respect to θ i ∈ M .
APPENDIX III PROOF OF LEMMA 1
Proof: We first consider the feasibility of Problem 3 and of Problem 4, i.e., to show that in either the case of CDMA and NOMA, there exists at least one pair of variables (p, z) such that all the constraints in the optimization problem are satisfied. This can be shown in a straightforward way through the existence of mean-field equilibrium as indicated in Theorem 1 and Theorem 2. Here, we use the case of NOMA for explanation. According to Theorem 2, there exists a unique mean-field equilibrium strategy p * ordered ∈ A for the game G when NOMA is adopted. Based on the definition of mean-field equilibrium, we can obtain that for any a i ∈ E, θ i ∈ M ,
It is equivalent tõ
where the interference term z * (θ i ) is assigned the value z * (θ i ) = E[p * ordered (θ j )θ j 1 {θj <θi} ]. Thus, it is evident that the pair (p * ordered , z * ) satisfies the constraints in Problem 4, i.e., Problem 4 is feasible. Following the same procedures with the help of Theorem 1, Problem 3 can be shown to be feasible as well. Now, we propose some necessary conditions for the optimality of solutions to these two optimization problems. Thus the feasible set of variables where optimal solutions reside can be further truncated. Still, we restrict our arguments to the NOMA case for explanation.
To begin with, we focus on the constraint z(θ i ) ≥ E[p(θ j )θ j 1 {θj <θi} ]. We aim at showing that any pairs of optimal solution (p * , z * ) to Problem 4 satisfies z * (θ i ) = E[p * (θ j )θ j 1 {θj <θi} ] a.e. in M .
We pick a pair of decision variables (p, z) satisfyingũ(p(θ i ), z, θ i ) ≥ũ(a i , z, θ i ), ∀θ i ∈ M and there exists a bounded set M 2 ⊂ M satisfying P (M 2 ) > 0 and for any θ i ∈ M 2 , there is z(θ i ) > E[p(θ j )θ j 1 {θj <θi} ]. Assume (p, z) is an optimal solution to Problem 4.
Define a measurable function : M 2 → R such that (θ i ) := z(θ i )−E[p(θ j )θ j 1 {θj <θi} ] > 0. Since the space M ⊂ R is a metric space, according to Lemma 4.1 (Lusin's theorem) in Chapter II of [29] , for 2 := 1 2 P (M 2 ) > 0, there exists a closed set M 2 ⊂ M 2 such that ν(M 2 \M 2 ) ≤ 2 and the restriction of the measurable function on the set M 2 , which is denoted as M2 : M 2 → R, is continuous. Since M 2 is bounded, the closed set M 2 ⊂ M 2 is compact. Hence, based on Weierstrass extreme value theorem [30] , there exists a θ ∈ M 2 such that inf θi∈M2 M2 (θ i ) = M2 (θ ) = (θ ) > 0. Then, we construct a new variablez such that z(θ i ) := z(θ i ) − 1 K (θ i ), θ i ∈ M 2 ; z(θ i ), Otherwise,
where K > 1 is a scaling factor. In order for the constructed variablez to satisfy the constraintũ(p(θ i ), z, θ i ) ≥ũ(a i , z, θ i ), ∀θ i ∈ M , we obtain an updated version of the optimal power control variablep in response to the change in the interference term from z toz. Since the individual utility functionũ(a i , z, θ i ) in the optimization problem is strictly concave with respect to the variable a i , it has a unique maximizer in terms of a i when other variables are fixed. Then, the updated version of the optimal power control strategyp(θ i ) is expressed as It remains to verify the existence of a scaling factor K > 1 such that the pair (p,z) satisfies the constraint z(θ i ) ≥ E[p(θ j )θ j 1 {θj <θi} ] for any θ i ∈ M . By definition of (p,z), it suffices to show thatz(θ i ) ≥ E[p(θ j )θ j 1 {θj <θi} ] for any θ i ∈ M 2 .
According to the derivations in (30) , for any θ i ∈ M , |p(θ i ) −p(θ i )| = arg max ai∈Eũ (a i , z, θ i ) − arg max ai∈Eũ (a i ,z, θ i )
Hence for any θ i ∈ M ,
As (θ i ) > 0 for any θ i ∈ M 2 and 0 ≤ E[ (θ j )] < ∞ is a constant, there exists a sufficiently large K such that
where the last inequality holds due to (θ i ) = M2 (θ i ) ≥ inf Therefore, z * (θ i ) = E[p * (θ j )θ j 1 {θj <θi} ] holds almost everywhere in M is a necessary condition for an optimal solution to Problem 4.
In light of the proof above, the same arguments can be applied to Problem 3 and a necessary condition for optimality can be obtained that z * (θ i ) = E[p * (θ j )θ j ] holds almost everywhere in M . Thus the proof is finished.
